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ABSTRACT 
We examine how institutional changes that lower the barriers to successful exit influence the rate 
of IPO’s, the initial capitalization, and the performance of subsequent ventures. Such IPO market 
reforms are widespread, but their effectiveness is unclear. To do so, we take advantage of a 
quasi-natural experiment in which the IPO listing requirements in Japan were dramatically 
reduced. Using a unique database of over 19,000 new firms incorporated after 1982, we find that 
IPO market reform is a powerful institutional lever that increases the rate of IPOs. But it is also a 
narrow instrument that influences only few industries and triggers poor average performance in 
those industries. Overall, we find that IPO market reform is a complex institutional change. We 
conclude with contributions at the nexus institutional theory and entrepreneurship that indicate 
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There is substantial interest across the world in institutional changes that stimulate 
entrepreneurship. As part of these efforts, in the past decade, several nations have introduced 
reforms that ease the listing requirements for an IPO in public equity markets. The U.S. and 
Canada, as well as European nations such as Germany with Frankfurt’s New Market, and Asian 
nations such as Korea and Malaysia, launched public equity markets with lowered IPO listing 
requirements to encourage IPOs and incentivize the establishment of new technical ventures. For 
example, the JOBS Act relaxed SEC registration requirements and Sarbanes-Oxley requirements 
to ease new firms into IPO’s. Similarly, Japan created several public equity markets with greatly 
reduced IPO listing requirements, including allowing even unprofitable firms to “go public”. The 
common logic behind these institutional reforms is that lowered barriers to successful exit such 
as IPO’s encourage individuals to start technical firms, attract investors, and create an economic 
engine that recycles capital, drives job growth, and creates economic prosperity. But, while 
appealing, the effect on economic growth of such reforms is less clear. Moreover, factors in other 
nations including the economic dominance by large business groups, preference for debt 
financing, strong family ties, and cultural proclivity to avoid risk suggest that such IPO market 
reforms may have only modest influence (Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2008).    
Institutional theory provides a lens to examine these policy initiatives. Recent literature 
connecting entrepreneurship and institutional theory suggests that entrepreneurship is a social 
construct that is molded by shared beliefs of what is appropriate behavior as well as accepted 
templates of organizing productive activity (Sine & David, 2010). A central principles of 
institutional theory is that organizations must conform to the “cultural-cognitive belief systems 
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and regulatory and normative structures that prevail in a given organizational community” 
referred to as the institutional environment (Baum & Rao, 2004). By conforming, organizations 
gain access to elements of the institutional environment such as industry legitimacy, norms, 
human and technical capital necessary for entrepreneurship (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). In this 
way, new ventures that conform to the institutional environment, then, obtain advantages in 
gathering resources from external stakeholders such as capital, employees, and customers 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The institutional environment affects the 
ventures that form, the types of individuals that found firms, and their subsequent performance, 
(Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010; Sine & David, 2010).  For example, in a study of startup rates 
in 90 different countries found that the regulatory structure, financial institutions, and normal 
business practices - among other institutional factors - determine the rate of venture activity 
(Klapper, Amit, & Guillén, 2010).  In another example, a study of biotech startups in San Diego 
demonstrated that institutional factors that condition IPO rates help to determine the rate of 
industry startups, the resources available to them, and their subsequent performance (Stuart & 
Sorenson, 2003a). Even the institutions that affect the death of firms provide resources to new 
firms as talent, knowledge, and assets are recycled into the founding environment, (Hoetker & 
Agarwal, 2007). 
Recently, scholars of entrepreneurship and institutions have focused increasing attention 
on changing institutions, (Tolbert, David, & Sine, 2010). The idea is that if the institutional 
environment conditions new venture formation and outcomes, then changes in that environment 
must also affect new firms (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002). Attention has focused on the 
changes to the starting environment and how it affects the startup rate and the growth trajectory 
of new ventures (Sine & David, 2003). One strand relates institutional changes that lower entry 
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barriers to increased venture formation. These changes ease access to market opportunities, 
making entrepreneurs more likely to enter. Some of these changes involve lowering friction such 
as capital and licensing requirements as well as taxes and market entry permissions (Ciccone & 
Papaloannou, 2010). For example, a cross-country comparison of European countries finds that 
streamlining procedures for obtaining licenses and permits for starting new firms increases 
venture formation (Klapper, Laevena, & Rajan, 2006). Similarly, a study of approximately 
43,000 MIT alumni from 1930 to 2005 argues that reducing the friction of industry deregulation 
increases venture formation in the deregulated industries (Hsu, Roberts, & Eesley, 2007). Other 
institutional changes lower entry barriers by providing entrepreneurs with additional resources 
that make entry more viable. For instance, when U.S. policy makers simplified the legal steps to 
start solar power ventures, they also provided financial resources to do so. As expected, the 
formation of new solar ventures increased (Meek, Pacheco, & York, 2010). Still other changes 
lower entry barriers by eliminating legal restrictions to opportunities. When the U.S. government 
passed PURPA, for example, it legalized the sale of power to the electric grid by independent 
energy firms. This spurred the founding of new firms (Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert, 2005). 
 A second strand of research examines the influence of changes to the institutional 
environment that influence growth of new ventures. In particular, lowering barriers to growth 
makes it more likely the individuals with higher social and human capital will start firms. That is, 
individuals who have better employment opportunities based on their human and social capital  
are likely to choose entrepreneurship if lowered growth barriers raise the likelihood of a 
sufficiently high return (Sørensen & Chang, 2006; Stuart & Sorensen, 2007). For example, a 
study of alumni of the leading technical university in China, Tsinghua University, examines the 
influence of lowering growth barriers by the Chinese government (Eesley, 2010). Specifically, 
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the government removed the legal barriers that blocked entry into state-controlled industries that 
offered superior returns. This institutional change allowed elite individuals to form firms in the 
newly opened industries, and they did. Prior to this change, elite individuals usually chose 
employment in government and state-owned enterprises that were seen as more attractive careers 
than starting firms. Overall, these two strands indicate that institutional changes to the 
environment surrounding the start of ventures have important effects for their rates of formation 
as well as their subsequent performance. 
 While institutional change of the founding conditions of new ventures has received 
attention, what has been less explored is the effect of institutions that surround and condition the 
end of firms. While it is logical and well established to expect effects from the starting 
institutional environment, recent studies suggest that the institutions that condition ending 
outcomes have a role in new venture formation and performance. For example, making it less 
onerous to declare corporate bankruptcy are likely to change a founders evaluation of the likely 
consequence of starting a new firm – making starting a firm more attractive for individuals, 
particularly those who are risk averse or otherwise have more to lose (Eberhart, Eesley, & 
Eisenhardt, 2012; Peng, Yamakawa, & Lee, 2009b). In addition, a study of state bankruptcy laws 
in the U.S. finds that more protection of personal assets during the bankruptcy process 
encourages individuals with more assets at risk to start firms (Fan & White, 2003). The death of 
firms can also have effects by altering the entrepreneurial resource and opportunity environment. 
For instance, a study of the enactment of U.S. prohibition laws finds that this legislation and the 
related social movement forced the exit of alcoholic beverage producers, and yet simultaneously 
created opportunities in the soft drink industry. This was because alcoholic beverage producer 
exits enabled new soft drink firms to “repurpose” some assets of alcoholic beverage producers 
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(Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009). Overall, institutional changes that change the institutional 
environment attending the death of ventures influences the types of companies that form and 
their trajectories.  
By studying the changes to venture performance after changes in the institutions at the 
death of other firms, we understand the profound effect that institutions have on individual’s 
willingness to found a firm, but also the effect that this process has on creating superior firms.  
Yet, we find no literature that looks at the performance of firms founded after changes to 
institutions that affect the exit of successful firms which is a consequential event when many 
investors and some entrepreneurs’ ultimate outcomes are made manifest. We thus add to this 
stream by examining effects on the performance of new ventures after reform of institutions that 
condition the initial public offering, the IPO.  Studies of the rules that govern successful 
outcomes have tended to focus on the characteristics of ventures that will increase IPO likelihood. 
For example, studying internet startups in the US, research found that the reputation of investors, 
the quality of strategic alliances and the level of initial capital, shorten the time before an IPO is 
reached and increased its likelihood (Chang, 2004). In a second stream the effect of investors and 
market timing on the performance of IPO firms has been studied.  A study of US biotech firms 
found that equity from prominent strategic alliance partners or VC’s obtain IPO’s more rapidly 
and earn greater valuations at IPO than firms that lack such relationships (Stuart, Hoang, & 
Hybels, 1999) . This is because such relationships confer positive status to the new venture. 
These results have been supplemented by studies of IPO’s in Japan that found that investor 
identity has a positive effect on performance (Hamao, Packer, & Ritter, 2000). There is also 
recent literature examining the U.S. JOBS act and its effect on jobs. However, these results are 
inconclusive and the empirical analyses focus on job creation and destruction effects (Kenney, 
  
7 
Patton, & Ritter, 2012) Accordingly, while the effects of firm and investor characteristics on IPO 
likelihood is studied, we find no literature that examines changes in IPO rules that ease obtaining 
an IPO and their effects on new firm performance. Overall, despite the widespread adoption of 
IPO market reform, it is unclear how this institutional change influences firm performance and 
ultimately economic prosperity. There is a gap in our knowledge of the effect of changes to 
institutions that lower barriers to successful exit affect the performance of new firms. We 
address this gap.  
We ask: How do changes in the institutional environment that lower barriers to 
successful exit influence the performance of subsequent ventures?  Our setting is Japan. We take 
advantage of a quasi-natural experiment in which the IPO listing requirements in Japan were 
dramatically reduced in 2000. Using data on firms founded before and after the reform, we 
examine how this reform influenced IPOs, capitalization, types of founders, and performance of 
subsequently founded firms. Japan is an appropriate setting for our study. Like many countries, 
the Japanese favor debt financing, large and established business groups, and low risk taking 
within a collectivist ideology (Franks, Mayer, & Miyajima, 2009). Thus, Japan is a challenging 
context for individualistic Western-style IPO market reform to take hold. Yet also like many 
countries, many Japanese believe that entrepreneurship, including IPO market reform, plays a 
key role in the economic prosperity of the West (Imai & Kawagoe, 2000).  
We contribute to the nexus institutional theory and entrepreneurship. Prior research 
examines entry, growth, and exit barriers and finds implications for the rate of new firm 
formation (Sine et al., 2005) and the mix entrepreneurs who launch firms (Eesley, 2010; Fan & 
White, 2003). But it leaves unexamined the question of barriers to successful exits like IPOs and 
their efficacy. Using institutional arguments and exploiting a quasi-natural experiment in Japan, 
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we find that barriers to successful exit like IPOs have complex outcomes. On the one hand, IPO 
market reform is a powerful reform that increases IPOs, and enhances the capitalization and 
performance of new firms. On the other hand, IPO market reform is also a blunt reform that has 
no effect in many industries, damages performance where it does have an effect, and helps only 
particular entrepreneurs.  
We build on the stream of institutional change literature in three ways. First, we add to 
the recent idea that new ventures are profoundly affected by the events and institutions 
associated with the ending of firms, notwithstanding the founding environment. This is because 
making IPO’s easier focused investment narrowly and affected performance negatively. Second, 
we show that changes in beliefs, as Japanese actors compared their relative economic fortunes to 
the U.S. during the 1990’s, generated institutional change. Business leaders in Japan began to 
compare themselves and their formal institutions to the U.S. after seeing the boom going on there 
in the technology sector. Finally, our findings suggest that adopted institutions change behavior 
gradually as they become accepted and formalized in a different place. We find that investment 
actions based on new beliefs are strongest where there are prominent international social 
networks. The reason is that novel beliefs are adopted first where there are the most frequent 
business relationships between the adopting and source counties. Therefore, we add to the 
literature a context-dependent view of institutional diffusion. Overall, we contribute an 
understanding of the effects how institutional change, and how this institutional change tends to 






BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
IPO Equity Market Reform in Japan 
The institutional environment of Japan was changed by an economic contraction that 
began after an asset bubble collapsed in 1990. This launched a prolonged era of declining 
Japanese asset values and a decade of stagnant business activity. Scholarly and popular 
assessments of Japan’s business environment increasingly led to broad criticism that the 
Japanese institutional architecture for business was no longer relevant in a globalized setting 
(Eberhart & Hoetker, 2010; Storz, 2008). The Japanese business environment was unfriendly to 
entrepreneurial activity, beset by structural problems, and not keeping pace with emerging rivals 
(Anchordogy, 1997; Vogel, 2006). As Japanese policy makers and business leaders searched for 
remedies, many were struck by the entrepreneurial environment of the U.S., especially Silicon 
Valley, which was enjoying unprecedented prosperity. In particular, vibrant IPO equity markets 
in the U.S. were an exemplar for many Japanese observers. These markets were seen as 
exceptional with regard to the creation of wealth, especially in comparison with Japan’s decade 
of post-bubble stagnation (Kneller, 2007; Schaede, 2008). In contrast, the paucity of IPO’s in 
Japan prior to the reform that we study was explained in part by stringent high requirements for 
IPO in Japan (Liang & Huang, 2012; Rowen & Toyoda, 2002). Thus, interest arose in adoption 
of IPO market reform within Japan. 
To understand this reform better, we briefly describe the evolution of Japanese business 
financing over the past century. For the first half of the 20th century, Japanese firms often used 
equity (Franks et al., 2009). But this financial model changed during the second half of the 
century with the rise of Japan as an economic power, and the success of the keiretsu business 
groups. Japanese firms favored debt financing through the banking system, and this became the 
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norm (Franks et al., 2009). Further, new firms had particular difficulty raising money. The public 
equity markets with their onerous IPO requirements were unwelcoming and even inaccessible to 
them. Private equity such as venture capital was tied to the large banks (Kenney, Han, & Tanaka, 
2002) and difficult to obtain. The result was that the capital needs of most Japanese firms relied 
substantially on debt, and new firms had difficulty raising capital at all. 
Given the Japanese stagnation and the success of public equity markets in the West, 
Japanese actors began to view the U.S. IPO system as more appropriate than the high barriers 
that existed on Japanese exchanges to obtain IPO’s. Acting on these ne beliefs, some Japanese 
began to act. Specifically, two new equity markets with lowered IPO listing requirements were 
created in 2000. An immediate aim was to take advantage of financial opportunities that might 
be similar to those in the ongoing IPO boom in the U.S., which had been very profitable for 
many (Harris, 2006). Moreover, Japanese public policy makers encouraged these efforts as a way 
to stimulate entrepreneurial activity.  
Softbank (a major Japanese investor in the U.S.) and the U.S. National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) established the first of these equity markets, NASDAQ Japan, in 
1999. Trading began in June 2000. In contrast to the existing markets, the IPO listing 
requirements of NASDAQ Japan lowered the traditional minimum firm age requirement, and 
imposed neither net asset nor profitability requirements for candidate firms. Subsequently, this 
market became associated with one of the two major Japanese stock exchanges, the Osaka Stock 
Exchange.  Similarly, the second major exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, created a new 
public equity market, MOTHERS, with a similar drastic lowering of IPO listing requirements. 
Full trading began in early 2000 (Mizuno, 2006).   
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These two new equity markets sought to accommodate IPO activity, especially among 
young and growing ventures, by providing ready access to capital at early stages of their 
development – even before reaching scale and profitability. Thus, very small and new firms that 
were losing money could now “go public” in Japan. Table 1 compares the listing requirements of 
these new public equity markets with the benchmark first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  
Hypotheses: Implications of IPO Equity Market Reform 
In our first hypothesis, we argue that the IPO market reform described above 
subsequently increased IPOs. That is, lowered barriers to successful exit did in fact increase this 
form of exit. This is likely to occur because many entrepreneurs and their investors seek IPOs, 
and so lowered barriers are likely to increase the number of IPOs.  
To begin, many entrepreneurs and their investors regard an IPO exit as highly desirable 
and seek it for several reasons. First, an IPO provides investors and entrepreneurs with an 
opportunity to realize a tangible return on their investment. Thus, IPO offers liquidity for both 
investors and entrepreneurs such that they can diversify their risk and reinvest their capital 
elsewhere. In other words, they can “cash out”. Also, IPOs usually are more lucrative than a 
successful exit via acquisition (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004). Second, from the firm perspective, 
an IPO typically provides much needed capital for further investment, and so provides a basis for 
growth (Black & Gilson, 1998). Capital raised in the public equity markets is also often priced 
attractively relatively to other financing. Third, an IPO is a signaling event in a firm’s history 
that conveys success and legitimacy to stakeholders such as customers, current and potential 
employees, and investors (Gompers & Lerner, 2010). It may even convey “rock star” status to 
the venture’s entrepreneurs and investors (Gompers, 1996). Overall, many entrepreneurs and 
investors seek IPOs. 
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Given that IPOs are often a desirable exit, lowering the barriers to IPOs through equity 
market reform is likely to trigger more IPOs. That is, by permitting IPO by firms with lower 
performance and other requirements, the population of eligible firms expands which leads to 
more firms going “IPO”. For example, a study of IPO requirements in different sections of the 
Toronto stock exchange confirms increased IPO activity occurs where there are lower listing 
requirements (Carpentier & Suret, 2009). Overall, since entrepreneurs and investors often 
consider IPO’s to be highly desirable exits, lowered IPO’s barriers are likely to motivate them to 
seek IPOs and thus, increase overall IPO activity. We expect greater IPO activity after the reform. 
Hypothesis 1a: Establishment of lowered IPO requirements increases the likelihood that 
new firms obtain an IPO. 
We also expect that the Japanese context will particularly influence the industries in 
which expected increases in IPO’s will occur. As argued above, the Japanese adopted IPO 
market reform largely because of their own economic challenges and observation of the success 
of such markets, particularly in the U.S. Lower IPO requirements in U.S. equity markets seemed 
to be a “winner” for everyone – i.e., exchange owners, entrepreneurs, investors, and the entire 
economy. Not surprisingly, the Japanese borrowed features from the U.S. template for IPO 
requirements when they established their own new equity markets (Deakin & Whittaker, 2009; 
Vogel, 2006). Indeed, Softbank (a frequent Japanese investor in the U.S. technology sector with 
venture capital offices in the U.S.) and NASDAQ (a U.S. stock exchange) combined to launch 
the first reformed market in 2000, reinforcing the link between these markets and the U.S. 
Moreover, the Japanese often equated IPOs with the technology sector because that was how the 
U.S. IPO equity markets were perceived (Anchordogy, 1997; Lynn & Kishida, 2004). So, 
although many companies outside of the technology industry “go public”, the most salient U.S. 
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IPO names like eBay, Cisco, Google, and Yahoo were in the technology sector. Thus, using the 
logic of mimetic institutional diffusion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hayagreeva¬†Rao, 
Philippe¬†Monin, & Rodolphe¬†Durand, 2003; Strang & Meyer, 1993), we argue that Japanese 
entrepreneurs and investors equated IPOs with the technology sector since that was the 
association in the system they came to take as right and proper. This taken-for-granted 
understanding is particularly ironic since some of the strengths of the Japanese economy such as 
the manufacturing sector and the domestic services and retail sectors were then largely ignored 
as attractive IPO opportunities.  
Overall, we argue that the cognitive association of IPOs with the technology sector, and 
disconnect of equity financing and entrepreneurship from the usual Japanese business practices 
suggest that IPO market reform will have its greatest effects in the technology sector.   
Hypothesis 1b: Establishment of lowered IPO requirements increases the likelihood that 
new firms in the technology industry obtain an IPO. 
While the first hypotheses are essentially a “manipulation checks” for the focal reform, the next 
hypothesis focuses on a key outcome of that reform. We argue that firms founded after the 
reform will have higher initial capitalization than firms founded before it. Two mechanisms 
underlie this argument.   
First, since IPO market reform increases the likelihood of achieving an IPO and doing so 
quickly, such reform is likely to attract investors and motivate them to invest more capital in new 
firms. Indeed, the opportunity costs of not investing increase as greater and earlier returns 
become more likely. This reinforces the willingness of investors fund new firms. New investors 
are likely to be attracted and current investors are likely to invest again when they expect a 
reasonable chance of liquidity (Black & Gilson, 1998). A rich body of research supports this 
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argument. For example, a study of U.S. venture capital funds shows that increasing IPO activity 
increases both the amount of money that VCs raise and the amount of money that they invest in 
new firms. Increased demand by investors for investments that tap into potential IPOs and 
matching demand for those funds by individuals attracted to founding firms by the lure of IPO 
are key drivers of these results (Gompers & Lerner, 1999). Similarly, using data from 21 
countries, another study finds that lowered government regulation of IPOs is related to increasing 
IPO activity and triggers more VC investment (Jeng & Wells, 2000).  
Second, more and more rapid IPOs are likely to increase the initial capitalization of 
subsequent ventures by recycling investment funds that are made liquid by prior IPOs. In other 
words, an IPO frees investment capital to invest again. When more IPOs occur and happen more 
quickly, investment capital becomes available and recycles more quickly. For example, a study 
in the U.S. biotech industry finds that more IPOs in local regions generate more subsequent 
biotech ventures in those regions, an outcome consistent with investment recycling in the VC 
industry where investment is often local (Stuart & Sorenson, 2003b).  Overall, lowered IPO 
listing requirements are likely to increase the capitalization of ventures founded after reform: 
Hypothesis 2a: The establishment of new lowered IPO requirements increases the 
starting capital investment in firms that are newly incorporated after reforms.  
 
We hypothesized above that Japanese entrepreneurs and investors viewed IPOs as a feature of 
technology industry success and the reform of the IPO list requirements were motivated to adopt 
what were perceived as more successful practices to encourage technical IPO’s.  Thus, it is likely 
that the investments encouraged by more IPO activity, as argued above, would be focused in 
technology firms. First, technology firms are taken-for-granted to be the intended purpose of IPO 
reform because the intent of these reforms is to provide financial incentives to entrepreneurs to 
that might ignite innovations (Wonglimpiyarat, 2009). Second, technical firms reach IPO faster 
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than other firms, increasing opportunity costs and reducing risk compared to other industries, 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2010; Kukies, 2002). Finally, investors tend to mimic other investors 
behavior because of concern about the appearance of appropriate investing among peers, (Iihara, 
Kato, & Tokunaga, 2001; Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). Overall, increased investment in the wake 
of IPO reform will likely be focused in technology firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The establishment of new lowered IPO requirements increases the 
starting capital investment in technology firms that are newly incorporated after reforms. 
 
As noted earlier, several facets of the Japanese institutional environment are likely to work 
against IPOs and equity financing more broadly. Japanese firms favor debt financing (Franks et 
al., 2009). Thus, Japanese executives are less conditioned to consider equity financing. This 
equity mindset is reinforced by the fact that many venture capital firms are extensions of banks 
(Kenney et al., 2002). Japanese public policy also traditionally favors large firms in addition to 
debt financing through major banks (Aoki & Patrick, 1994; Hoshi & Kashyap, 2001). Although 
declining in importance, the lifetime employment that characterizes many Japanese firms 
provides attractive career alternatives that diminish interest in entrepreneurship. Thus, the 
Japanese institutional environment differs from the favorable environment in Silicon Valley 
regarding entrepreneurship, and its related career risks.  
 If, though, a change in the taken-for-granted environment occurred, it likely manifested 
first where international trade is most active and foreign owned firms are most likely to be found.  
Adoption of organizational practices and cognitive meanings diffuses slowly, particularly if it is 
a mimetic adoption process like then one we propose for IPO reform, (Guler, Guillen, & 
Macpherson, 2002; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). The diffusion is constrained both by existing local 
institutional framework, and enabled by the opportunity to act in new adopted frameworks such 
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as relaxed IPO requirements,(Casper, 2000). Thus, IPO reform as an adopted reform from the 
U.S. (Vogel, 2006), we expect the associated beliefs and knowledge of its anticipated effects to 
start in Tokyo since that is where most international trade and technical business relationships 
are centered. Thus, to supplement our argument that the initial hypothesized effect of IPO reform 
is increased investment in new venture; the effect will be particularly strong in Tokyo. 
H2c: The establishment of new lowered IPO requirements increases the starting capital 
investment in firms starting in Tokyo that are newly incorporated after reforms. 
 
The prior hypotheses argue that the IPO reform will increase the number of IPOs and the 
capitalization of new firms founded after the reform. The next hypothesis focuses on how the 
reform influences firm performance. Specifically, we argue that firms founded after the reform 
are likely to be higher performing than those founded before.  
One reason is that more resources are likely to increase firm performance. As we argued 
in H2a,b,c when IPOs are more likely, they attract more investment that is likely to give new 
firms more financial resources. More financial resources are beneficial for obtaining other 
necessary resources such as human capital and intellectual property that are essential for 
developing new products (Brush, Greene, Hart, & Haller, 2001; Hallen, 2008; Stuart & Sorenson, 
2003a). Thus, new firms need sufficient financial resources to hire employees, fund expansion 
and innovation, and even just to survive. Also, more resources enable ventures to withstand 
unexpected shocks and setbacks (Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 2001). Thus, more financial 
resources are likely to improve the performance of new firms (Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Barney, 
1991; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Substantial evidence supports this argument. For 
example, in a study of 91 U.S. restaurant chains, greater initial resources are associated with 
more aggressive growth strategies and better performance (Combs & Ketchen, 1999). In a study 
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of 210 British firms, more financial resources are associated with higher performance across 
diverse industries. In particular, firms with greater access to financial resources were better able 
to weather unforeseen circumstances and take advantage of unexpected opportunities (Greenley 
& Oktemgil, 1998). A number of studies also find that ventures with more alliance relationships 
are also higher performing (Baum & Bird, 2010; Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Ozcan & 
Eisenhardt, 2009). Here the argument is that, when ventures form alliances, they gain access to 
the financial resources and complementary assets of their partners. These increased resources 
then improve their performance. 
More resources are also linked to better performance because they enable entrepreneurs 
to pursue “higher risk, higher return” opportunities that can generate superior, albeit highly 
variable, performance (Nanda & Rhodes-Kropf, 2011). This argument is supported in a study of 
the effects of additional resources on risk taking and performance in 385 U.S. firms. Using the 
variance of a firm’s forecasted performance as the measure of risk, the findings indicate that 
more resources led to greater risk taking and performance (Greve, 2012; Wiseman & Bromiley, 
1996). Similarly, an examination of Japanese shipbuilding firms finds that firms with more 
resources are more innovative and subsequently higher performing as measured by sales growth 
(Greve, 2003). Finally, while it is possible to have too many resources such that performance is 
dampened (Katila & Shane, 2005), this seems unlikely in the Japanese context. The Japanese 
venture financing environment is less munificent than the United States venture environment 
such that excess resources seem unlikely to be problematic (Hoshi & Kashyap, 1999; Milhaupt, 
1996). Thus, we argue that IPO market reform is likely to increase the performance of firms 
founded after the reform.  
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Hypothesis 3a: The establishment of new lowered IPO requirements is associated with 
increased performance for new firms incorporated after reforms 
In H2b, we argued that technology firms in particular will acquire more resources because the 
focusing of taken-for-granted beliefs that the reform is most salient in the technology industry. 
The reforms were adopted to encourage the creation of new technology firms. Should additional 
resources be particularly provided to technology firms, for the reasons above we expect that 
technology firms’ performance will be particularly augmented.  
Hypothesis 3b: The establishment of new lowered IPO requirements is associated with 
increased performance for new technology firms incorporated after reforms, 
As, we argued above, additional investment is likely focused in Tokyo where the influence of 
both government and foreign trade carry the expectation that investment in new firms is the 
proper action when IPO reforms are implemented. Thus, the additional resources should augment 
the performance of new firms particularly in Tokyo.  
Hypothesis 3c: The establishment of new lowered IPO requirements is associated with 
increased performance for new firms incorporated in Tokyo after reforms, 
METHODS 
Our sample consists of firms in the COSMOS 3 database from Teikoku Databank, Ltd. 
(TDB). TDB is a commercial credit rating firm in Tokyo (founded 1890), and one of the two 
leading firms in Japan providing credit ratings to corporate clients. Since Japanese firms rely on 
this database for evaluating supplier and customer credit worthiness, it is particularly 
comprehensive and accurate in its capture of firms with any commercial activity. In addition, this 
database includes variables that are especially relevant for studying the founding, and 
performance of new firms such as their capitalization. Consistent with the quality of these data, 
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Teikoku Databank data are used by numerous Japanese scholars in research (Miyamoto & Rexha, 
2001; Schaede, 2008; Singleton & Globerman, 2002; Suzuki, Kim, & Bae, 2002; Takhashi & 
Nakamura, 2009), and public policy evaluation (ACCJ, 2010).  
The 2012 edition of the COSMOS 3 Database consists of Japanese firms incorporated 
through 2011. These firms include the common legal forms of formal business organization in 
Japan excluding sole proprietorships and including partnerships, limited liability companies, 
special corporations, and stock issuing corporations2.  Each record in the database consists of 
initial firm measures including capitalization, CEO characteristics, incorporation date, legal form, 
and industry as well as current measures of the focal firm including employees and IPO status. 
The database also includes financial performance data for the most recent three fiscal years – e.g., 
revenue and profit. We begin our observations in 1990 because that year marks the beginning of 
Japan’s post-asset bubble environment. We end the observation period in 2007 just prior to the 
2008 financial crisis. Our sample consists of 19,168 firms. 
Dependent Variables 
We examine H1 and using event history analysis in which the dependent variable event is 
the occurrence of an IPO.  We code this event as 1 in the year that the firm experiences an IPO, 
and 0 if there is no IPO. We obtain these data from the TDB database.  
For H2a,b,c, we measure the dependent variable, initial capitalization, as the log value of 
the opening capital account at firm founding in thousands of yen, initial_capital (log), in 
constant 2009 yen. As is common in the entrepreneurship literature, we designate founding as 
date of incorporation, and obtain these data from the TDB database.  
                                                
2 These firms include stock issuing firms (kabushiki kaisha 株式会社), special non-stock issuing corporations (tokurei yugen 
kaisha 特例有限会社), limited partnerships (goshi kaisha 合資会社 and godo kaisha 合同会社), and general partnerships, 
(gomei kaisha	 合名会社), and exclude firms with no commercial activity such as sole-proprietor hobby firms.  
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For H3a,b,c, we measure the dependent variable, firm performance, as the compound 
annual sales growth rate, growth, of the focal firm. Sales growth is an appropriate measure of 
venture performance because sales growth is a salient measure of firm performance across all 
industries since firms ultimately require revenue to survive regardless of industry. Sales growth 
is also an antecedent financial outcome to other common and important financial measures such 
as profitability (Davidsson, Achtenhagen, & Naldi, 2007). Sales growth is also commonly used 
in prior studies of venture performance (Baum & Bird, 2010; Chandler & Hanks, 1993; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Gersick, 1994; Hall, 1987; Hmieleski & Baron, 2009). 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Baum & Bird 2010), we compute sales growth as compound 
annual growth rate that takes the nth root of the total percentage growth rate where n is the 
number of years in the period being considered using a starting value of “1”. We compute this 
measure from founding to 2007. As a robustness check, we also use a second performance 
measure, employment growth, with consistent results. 
Independent Variables 
We hypothesize the effects of the Japanese IPO market reform in all of our hypotheses. 
We measure the occurrence of that reform as the year, 2000, when, as described earlier, firms 
were first able to list on Japanese public equity markets with dramatically lowered IPO 
requirements such that even young, small, and unprofitable firms could “go public”. Thus, we 
measure when the focal venture began relative to this reform with a binary variable, reform, that 
is 1 if the focal firm is founded during or after 2000, and 0 otherwise.  
In H2c, and H3c, we hypothesize about the effect of firm location. We define two 
locations, the Tokyo and Osaka metropolitan regions, which are the two largest urban regions in 
Japan and the home of the reformed IPO markets. Tokyo is the focus of international trade with 
over 74% of foreign owned firms in our database located there versus 3.1% in Osaka. We 
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operationalize the locations with binary variables that are 1 if the location of a firm’s home office 
has a postal address code in the respective metropolitan region defined by Japan Post.  This 
includes the cities proper and associated suburbs. 
In all hypotheses, we test interaction effects of IPO market reform with the initial 
industry of the new ventures. TDB assigns firms to their initial industries using the well-known 
and widely used SIC codes (Robb & Reedy, 2009) at the 4-digit level. But since TDB sometimes 
assigns a firm to a 4-digit SIC code when their activities are more diverse, we conservatively use 
the 2-digit industry level. Following prior research, we then group these 2-digit industries into 
logical bins (Folta & O'Brien, 2003). That is, we classify each firm into one of seven industry 
categories: Primary, Manufacturing, Wholesale/Retail, Service, Finance, Construction, and 
Technology. We test our hypotheses for the technology industry, but also include these other 
industries to enhance robustness and insight. 
Control Variables 
Foreign Ownership: We also control initial foreign ownership for several reasons. In the 
case of IPOs, empirical studies indicate that foreign investors have different expectations for 
return and speed of return than domestic Japanese investors (Deakin & Whittaker, 2009). Thus, 
they are likely to press for IPO sooner. It is also likely that foreign investors are not subject to the 
same social expectations and constraints as domestic investors. Japanese studies show that 
foreign investors select investments with different (shorter) time horizons and expect higher 
returns (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; Asaba, 2005). Thus, foreign ownership is likely to 
increase the probability of IPO. Foreign ownership is also likely to increase the likelihood that 
firms have higher initial capitalization (H2a,b,c). Foreign ownership suggests that entrepreneurs 
with broad access to capital beyond domestic investors are likely to be able to raise more capital. 
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Finally, firms with foreign ownership are more likely to have higher financial performance, 
especially sales growth (H3a,b,c). The underlying argument is, as above, that such investors 
often have more aggressive goals, and so will apply greater pressure on the new firm to grow 
quickly. In addition, foreign investors may open opportunities in their domestic markets that 
favor the new firm, and may serve as a signal of the global presence of the firm (Kimura & 
Kiyota, 2004). These effects make high performance more likely. We measure, foreign 
ownership, by a “1” if the focal firm is initially 25% or more owned by foreign organizations or 
individuals. We obtain these data from the TDB database.   
Founder’s Gender and Over 40 Founder: We also control for several initial founder 
characteristics because they can imprint the operating blueprint of the firm (Beckman & Burton, 
2008; Boeker, 1989), and determine its initial advantages (or disadvantages) that often 
compound over time (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Specifically, we control for whether 
the firm has an over 40 founder because older founders are likely to form new firms that are 
more successful and therefore more likely to IPO (H1), as well as have high financial 
performance including high sales growth (H3a,b,c). In addition, older founders are also likely to 
be more able to attract investors than other founders, and so accumulate high initial capitalization 
for their firms (H2a,b,c). We measure Over 40 Founders by using CEO birth date. We obtain 
these data from the TDB database.  We also control for the gender of the founder. females in 
Japan are less attached to the business environment than males because of long-standing 
institutional structures that made their entry difficult (Futagami & Helms, 2009). Recently, 
studies have found an increasing entry of females into new ventures (Griffy-Brown, 2010). 
Moreover, empirical studies of U.S. venture capital investing suggest that the gender of the 
founder affects the amount invested in a new venture and its valuation, (Hart, Greene, Brush, & 
  
23 
Saparito, 2001). Since our arguments examine the interaction of new beliefs with an incumbent 
environment, female founders are likely to affect investment. If a founding CEO is a male we 
code the variable, Founder’s Gender, as 1 and otherwise 0. 
 Fixed Effects: We control for industry fixed effects. Industry influences the likelihood of 
IPO (H1, H4a) because firms in some industries may need the additional resources that IPO 
provides, and some industries may be more attractive to public investors. Industry also is likely 
to influence factors such as the amount of capital needed to start a firm and the ability of firms to 
raise capital (H2, H4b) and the rate of firm growth (H3, H4c). Thus, we capture industry fixed 
effects, industry, and categorize the industries as described above.  We control for annual fixed 
effects using annual binary variables following the methodology of estimating multiple control 
groups with sufficiently large sample sizes (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). This 
enables us to control for differences in the macro-economic and business environments that 
might influence the likelihood of IPO, initial capitalization and performance.  
Other Effects: For H1, and H3a,b,c, we control for firm size as measured by the log of 
employee size, Employees (log). We expect that firms with more employees are more likely to 
IPO and to have higher growth. We also explicitly control for the macroeconomic environment 
because these conditions are likely to influence IPO exit, initial capitalization, and growth. We 
do so using the variable, GDP Growth, which is the cumulative average growth rate of GDP for 
the three years centered on a firm’s incorporation – in constant 2009 yen using data from the 
Statistics Japan database (Statistics, 2011). Finally, for H3a,b,c, we control for firm age. In 
addition, since prior research indicates that the growth of firms tends to slow over time (Evans, 
1987), we control for the age of the firm, firm age, and its square, firm age2, to capture 
diminishing quadratic growth compounded over time for our performance hypotheses  (Angelini 
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& Generale, 2008). 
Model Specification and Econometric Issues 
To analyze H1a,b, we estimate the effects of IPO market reform on a firm’s likelihood to 
complete an IPO before and after the reform. Because we are examining the effects of reform 
across two time periods, we adopt a piecewise Cox proportional hazards model that estimates the 
likelihood of an event before and after a chosen date so that we can compare likelihoods 
(Sørensen, 1999). In our case, our event of interest is an IPO and the reform date is 2000 as 
described earlier.  
One advantage of this model is that it does not impose strong parametric assumptions 
with regard to the hazard rate. This allows variation between selected periods unlike standard 
proportional hazard models, and so allows us to estimate the effects of the coefficient of reform 
on our dependent variables for the time periods before and after IPO market reform (Blossfeld & 
Rohwer, 2002; Sørensen, 1999). Since our study includes firms incorporated in 1990 and 
thereafter, and our focal reform occurs in 2000, we define two time segments: 1990-1999 and 
2000-2007. We test for IPO likelihood - operationalized with IPO.  We report exponential 
coefficients (hazard ratios), and compare them for a statistical difference with two sided unpaired 
t-tests.  
We use difference-in-differences analysis to examine H2a,b,c, H3a,b,c,. In this method, 
we examine the effects of a treatment (in our case, IPO market reform) by comparing the 
outcomes of treatment groups after treatment with the outcomes of treatment groups before the 
treatment, and of a control group. Outcomes are observed for several time periods. This model 
structure can apply, as in our case, to repeated cross sections (Wooldridge, 2007). We use 
primary industries (e.g., farming, coal mining, and forestry) as our control group because firms 
  
25 
in these industries are unlikely to be affected by IPO market reform, and yet still are affected by 
the broader environment. These firms are likely to exit by hereditary bequest but not IPOs, and 
otherwise exist in and respond to the broader environment. Thus, we expect that the 
environmental effects of general social and macroeconomic trends on these firms will be similar 
to those of firms in other industries. But unlike other industries, firms in the primary industries 
will be less affected by IPO market reform since executives in these industries follow traditional, 
often hereditary career paths – e.g., starting a dairy farm – and do not typically seek to IPO.  This 
approach allows us to determine whether the outcomes of the treatment group change differently 
from those of the control group because difference-in-difference estimation treats unmeasured 
factors as affecting the treatment and control groups equally (Campbell, 1969; Forman, Ghose, & 
Goldfarb, 2009). Since our analytic window has multiple time periods and industries, we follow 
the difference-in-differences method as described in prior research (Bertrand et al., 2004; Hansen, 
2007). Following this method, our model includes a full set of annual fixed effects, a full set of 
industry fixed effects, an institutional change – reform – that marks the date of our focal IPO 
market reform, controls, plus interactions between the focal reform with industry fixed effects 
and elite founders. Of analytic interest are the coefficients on the interaction variables that allow 
us to discern the effects of the focal reform on industry-level capitalization, industry-level 
performance, and performance of firms with elite founders. We estimate the effects of IPO 
market reform on initial capitalization (H2a,b,c) and on performance (H3,a,b,c). The reform 
“treatment” occurs in 2000. Because our data span distinct time periods, we mitigate the effects 
of heterogeneous distribution of independent variables by estimating these models with a 





We ask how equity market reform affects IPO’s, capitalization, and venture performance. 
Table 2a and 2b report summary statistics. Table 3 reports correlations.  Univariate data is 
consistent with our hypotheses H1a that IPO’s are more frequent after reforms with 2.45% of 
newly incorporated firms obtaining IPO after reform compared to 2.08% before reform. This is 
all the more notable because firms founded before reform have up to ten years more time to gain 
IPO that those founded after. Turning to the characteristic of companies that obtained IPO’s we 
find that most industries obtain IPO’s in proportion to their proportion of total stat ups. As 
expected, technology firms obtain IPO’s at more than twice their proportion of total startups 
indicating the technological firms association with IPO’s consistent with our H1b.  It is also 
notable that foreign owners own 25% or more of only 0.3% of newly incorporated firms before 
reform but that jumps to 2.03% after reforms and 2.45% for IPO firms incorporated after reform. 
Moreover, Tokyo is the home location of 20.01% of firms incorporated before reform but has 
74.40% of IPO firms incorporated after reforms suggesting that the idea that IPO’s are spatially 
associated with Tokyo, H2c. In addition, since the IPO proportion of Osaka firms before and 
after reform is unchanged, 8.22% versus 8.06% respectively, is suggestive of the centrality of 
Tokyo in IPO likelihood and associated behaviors.  Overall, the univariate data suggests that 
IPO’s did become more likely after reform, particularly among technology venture, and are 
associated with Tokyo.   
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2a, 2b and 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Turning out attention to multi-variate analyses, in H1a we argue that the IPO listing 
reform increases the likelihood of IPO. Table 4 reports the results of our Cox piecewise analysis.  
Model 1 is the controls result. As expected, elite founders, GDP growth, firm age, and number of 
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employees increases the likelihood of IPOs (model 1, p<0.001). We support H1a by finding that 
IPO activity is significantly greater after the reform than before by comparing the coefficients of 
the 1990 through 1999 period to the 2000 to 2007 period for the reform variable. Moreover, 
strong support is found in the positive and significant difference in the coefficients of the 
location variables, Tokyo and Osaka (model 1, p<0.001). We find a significant difference in 
these variables, using t-tests (p < 0.001), between pre-reform and post-reform time periods. In 
H1b, we argue that IPO market reform will particularly increase IPO likelihood in the 
technology industry. In Table 4, we examine the difference between IPO likelihood of types of 
firms before and after reform by comparing the coefficients of the industry variables across the 
two analysis periods. We find that only the technology coefficient differences in the two time 
periods are significant (p < 0.05). We thus support H1b, confirming that the IPO market reform 
significantly increased IPOs particularly in the technology industry sector. 
In H2a we argue that IPO equity market reform is likely to increase the initial 
capitalization of new firms founded after the reform. Table 5 reports the results of our difference-
in-differences analysis. Model 1 reports controls results only to indicate that ventures with 25% 
foreign ownership increase initial capitalization by gathering over Y4.6 million more investment 
(model 1, p < 0.001) compared to other firms. Notably, the reform variable is not significant 
implying that overall, firms founded after reforms do not have higher initial capitalization. 
Model 2 adds the coefficient the interaction between reform and our control (Primary Industry X 
Reform). As we expect, this coefficient is negative and significant supporting our differences in 
difference control assumptions. Model 4 adds other industry interactions to examine if  IPO 
market reform will particularly affect initial capitalization in the technology industry sector, H2b. 
The positive and significant coefficient (p < 0.001) on the technology X reform interaction 
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supports this hypothesis implying that technology firms attracted capital that other firms did not. 
Notably, all other industry-reform interactions are not significant and negative. The initial 
capitalization of the new firms in the technology industry increased after the reform by Y1.26 
million or 6% of the mean level before reform (p < 0.001). The implication is that the technology 
industry attracted more investment after the IPO market reform while investment in other 
industries remained stagnant or dropped, perhaps to support investment in technology firms.  
Turning to location effects, H2c, model 3 adds location interaction reforms for the Tokyo 
and Osaka locations. There is a significant and positive interaction of reform with being located 
in Tokyo (p < 0.001), but no significant effect associated with locating in Osaka. As the effect is 
manifest in Tokyo and not Osaka, it suggests strong support for our H2c.  A firm in Tokyo 
gathers over Y265 million yen more initial capital than other firms after reform.  The implication 
is that investor behavior in Osaka is less affected by reform than in Tokyo, which is consistent 
with the idea of the adoption of beliefs where international social networks are prevalent. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 and 5 about here 
------------------------------------- 
In H3a, we argue that firms founded after the IPO market reform are likely to have higher 
performance than those founded before. We present the results in Table 6. In model 1, we 
examine the controls. As expected, firms with foreign ownership and more employees are better 
performing than other firms, but the effect diminishes with the age of the firm and there is an 
unexpected significant negative performance effect overall with reform. Our interest is the 
interaction effects of particular industries with reform. In model 2, then, we add the industry 
interaction effects of the reform, and find that they are significant and negative (p < 0.001) in 
technology and service industries, and insignificant for all others. Thus, our hypotheses H3a, and 
H3b are not supported. We find instead that firms founded after the IPO market reform are not 
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performing better.  
Firms located in Tokyo do perform better after reform. Model 3 of table 6 adds location 
variable interactions, while Osaka located firms have no performance effects after reform, Tokyo 
firms growing 5.9% faster that non-Tokyo located firms after reform. We examine this 
interaction more closely by examining the interaction of Tokyo and reform with entering the 
technology industry, model 5, and find a negative and significant coefficient on the Tokyo X 
Technology X Reform triple interaction variable suggesting that as investment capital increased 
particularly into technology stock and Tokyo-based firms after reform, the overall performance 
of the sector is negative. Again, this doe not support our hypothesis. Overall, our surprising 
result is that not only does overall new venture performance decline after IPO reform, its 
particularly declines in the industries and location where our previous finding show that 
increased investment following reform was focused (H2b,c).  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Robustness checks 
 In results available from the authors, we also conducted a number of robustness checks 
and their results reinforce our findings. First, we examine whether broad trends might explain 
our results. We ran placebo regressions where we choose an artificial reform year for three years 
on either side of 2000 to determine whether the results are due to the actual reform or due to a 
general trend. These coefficients should not be significant, and indeed they are not. Second, we 
also examine an alternative specification of performance, employee growth. We found similar 
results to what report above.  
 Right censoring can affect our results, however the effect is conservative. New ventures 
that obtain IPO’s in Japan typically are eight to ten years old upon IPO (Eberhart, 2012). This 
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suggests that firms founded more recently in our sample are right censored since insufficient 
time is passed before the opportunity to IPO is manifest.  However, the effect is conservative. 
Right censoring biases the likelihood of IPO after reform lower in our proportional hazards 
model. Thus, the detection of the hypothesized effect (H1a,b) is made more difficult.  The bias is 
also likely to me smaller than this suggests. If reform causes shorter times to IPO, as we theorize, 
then this bias is mitigated. Overall, then, we do not expect right censoring of IPO’s to alter our 
findings. 
We also ran analyses controlling for other trends in GDP growth and macroeconomic 
factors, and found similar results. We tested for robustness to alternative control groups 
including bars, restaurants, spas and other industries that would have probably been unaffected 
by the reform. These regressions provide similar results, reinforcing our findings. We also ran 
analyses to control for bankruptcy reform, and find that our results hold. Overall, our findings are 
robust to other sensitivity checks and alternative specifications. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our central insight is that IPO market reform is a powerful institutional lever that affects 
new ventures because of anticipated conditions at the end of a firm’s entrepreneurial phase. 
Specifically, we find that lowering the barriers to successful exit by lowering IPO requirements 
makes IPO’s more likely – an outcome favored by investors and entrepreneurs to raise new funds, 
“cash out”, and gain the prestige of being a “successful entrepreneur”. We also find that this 
lowering of the barriers to successful exits attracts more capital investment in the technology 
sector that is associated with the reform, yet reduces venture performance in that industry.   
Specifically, we find that while lowering the barriers to successful IPO exit increases 
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IPO’s overall, it increases the initial capitalization of firms founded after reform only in the 
technology industry. It either does not affect or may actually pull investment away from other 
sectors. Thus, investors ironically neglect sectors like manufacturing and domestic services and 
retail where Japan has traditional strengths. Finally, IPO market reform may help founders to 
launch technology firms, but can damage the performance of those very firms. This surprising 
result suggests that policy intended to encourage new technical firms instead has unintended 
effects. The new investment in technology firms, and the reduced performance that follows is 
also focused spatially in the metropolitan region from which the beliefs about technical 
entrepreneurship and IPO’s emanate. Thus, IPO market reform is an unexpectedly complicated 
engine for economic prosperity.   
Implications at the Nexus of Entrepreneurship and Institutional Theory 
We also contribute at the nexus of entrepreneurship and institutional theory (Sine & 
David, 2010; Tolbert et al., 2010). Our results for the technology sector are particularly revealing 
here. First, we introduce the concept, barrier to successful exit. Prior research categorizes types 
of change that influence particular entrepreneurial activities (Romanelli, 1989; Sine & David, 
2003). It identifies barriers to entry as well as barriers to growth and failure (Ciccone & 
Papaloannou, 2010; Peng, Yamakawa, & Lee, 2009a). In contrast, a barrier to successful exit 
combines several of these changes into one. A successful exit like IPO is similar to growth in 
that it is a successful financial outcome. But it is also like a failure in that it is an exit of capital 
and often individuals. Thus, lowering barriers to successful exit is a complex mix that is likely to 
have complicated outcomes.  
Second, we indicate how lowering barriers to successful exit influences entrepreneurial 
outcomes. Prior research finds that lowering entry barriers increase new firm formation (Hiatt et 
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al., 2009; Hsu et al., 2007), while growth and failure barriers shift the mix of who becomes an 
entrepreneur (Eberhart et al., 2012; Eesley, 2010). But, successful exit barriers are more 
complicated, and so not surprisingly, their outcomes are more nuanced. Such barriers reduce the 
success chances of entrepreneurs in the affected industry, particularly when they gain resources. 
Thus, lowering successful exit barriers is a “two-edged” sword. It increases the investment and 
IPO activity that is beneficial to investors – at least in the short run – yet it lowers the 
performance of the investment targets suggesting that the medium and long term will have less 
desirable results. Thus, we contribute the insight that lowering the barriers to successful exit 
changes performance but only among the firms in industries that have the focused attention of 
investors who accept the beliefs associated with the reform. 
Third, we also contribute by clarifying why this “two-edged” sword emerges, and suggest 
one resolution of the tension between resources and performance. As we argued above, much 
research finds that more resources are beneficial to the performance of new firms. Indeed, new 
firms often require resources in advance of revenues (Gartner, Carter, & Reynolds, 2010; Hallen 
& Eisenhardt, 2011; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Substantial empirical evidence supports this 
argument, e.g., (Baum, Locke, & Smith, 2001; Cooper, Woo, & Dunkelberg, 1988; George, 
2005). Yet in contrast, some other research finds that too many resources limit performance. 
Excess resources can reduce focus on rapid product commercialization, delaying effective 
performance (Katila & Shane, 2005). Excess resources can create opportunism and complacency 
within the management team, and enable excessive salaries and unnecessary costs (Tan & Peng, 
2003). Excess resources can also encourage inappropriate risk-taking (Bromiley, 1991), and 




Our contribution is a possible resolution of this tension. We find that the benefits of many 
resources emerge when they are in the hands of advantaged entrepreneurs such as elite 
individuals who are likely to have the talent and skill to take advantage of the benefits that 
munificent resources provide. In contrast, less advantaged entrepreneurs appear to be less able to 
cope with the distractions that many resources bring. Overall, this finding reinforces the 
emerging literature that points to having the “right” type of entrepreneur in the “right” situation – 
e.g., Chinese returnee, user-founder, serial entrepreneur, etc. – at the helm of new firms (Dencker, 
Gruber, & Shah, 2009; Eesley & Roberts, 2012; Fuller & Rothaermel, 2012). In our study, this 
“right” type of entrepreneur is an elite entrepreneur who can take advantage of higher 
capitalization. 
Overall, we contribute at the nexus of institutional theory and entrepreneurship by 
providing a more complete and realistic view of the interrelationship between equity markets, 
investors, types of entrepreneurs and venture performance. What emerges is a deeper 
understanding of the duality of lowered barriers to successful exit. Attracting capital and the lure 
of success increase the likelihood IPO’s will occur and focuses investment in IPO expected 
industries. On the other hand, these same factors can damage the performance firms in those very 
industries likely because of the richness of resources provided. A next step for future research is 
to examine the generalizability of this result in other settings.  
Implications for Institutional Theory 
We contribute to the literature on institutional theory. It is understood that institutions - 
regulative, cognitive and normative - are important barriers faced by entrepreneurs. Much extant 
research, though, emphasizes the institutional environment at the start of a firm’s life (Sørensen 
& Chang, 2006). We extend institutional theory to the closing of a firm’s entrepreneurial life by 
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clarifying that institutional change is likely to be effective when it changes the conditions at the 
end of a venture’s entrepreneurial phase. Indeed, recent work is coalescing around the insight 
that institutional changes at the end of a firm changes the types of entrepreneurs who start firms, 
as well as the venture’s subsequent performance. So, for example, elite founders start new firms 
with superior growth when corporate bankruptcy laws are made more lenient (Eberhart et al., 
2012; Fan & White, 2003; Lee, Yamakawa, & Peng, 2007).  Our results show that institutions 
that condition the successful exit of a firm have material effects on the amount invested in new 
firms, the kinds of firms that receive investments, and their subsequent performance. To this we 
add a more nuanced view of the common and blunt instrument of making it easier to IPO. We 
also show that the institutions affect new ventures through their effects on the behaviors of 
salient actors. 
We also show evidence, consistent with cognitive and normative changes in beliefs, that 
Japanese actors compared their relative economic fortunes to the U.S. during the 1990’s, by 
observing that IPO market reform is more salient where individuals take-it-for-granted that it 
applies – i.e., the technology sector. In other words, Japanese investors appear to have an 
“unexamined” understanding of IPOs as relevant in the technology sector where well-publicized 
U.S. IPOs occur and where those individuals who reformed IPO markets in Japan often gained 
their own experience. So, founders and investors in technology sector engage with the IPO 
market reform as expected – i.e., they have more IPO activity and invest more capital after the 
reform. But, founders and investors whose attention is outside the technology sector appear to 
either ignore the IPO market reform or have little understanding of its potential relevance to 
them. Thus, we find that Japanese entrepreneurs and investors imitate the technology sector 
emphasis of IPO markets in the U.S., even though IPOs may be more salient in other sectors of 
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the Japanese economy including manufacturing where Japan has traditional strengths. Other than 
possibly siphoning investment to technology firms from other sectors, it acts as if (in the short 
run, anyway) the IPO market reform had never occurred in large sectors of the Japanese 
economy.   
Finally, our findings add to ideas of institution adoption and diffusion. Our results 
suggest that institutions adopted by observing and copying a different national context (in this 
case, the US during the technology boom) changed the behavior of investors gradually as new 
beliefs become accepted and formalized. This is supported by our empirical finding that while 
technology firms experience greater investment after reform, the effect is particularly strong in 
Tokyo Tokyo is the locus of international trade and also where foreign firms are likely to have 
local headquarters and employ local executives generating opportunities for beliefs to be 
communicated and diffuse. Changes of investment actions, then, are focused where there are the 
most international social networks. Thus, IPO reform does not manifest equally across Japan as 
if it was an exogenous change of expected outcomes and implies an adoption of beliefs through 
social networks. 
Overall, our findings indicate the relevance of institutional theory in understanding the 
consequences of institutional change on entrepreneurship. In particular, we find that institutional 
change to the conditions that end a firm’s entrepreneurial phase has a powerful influence on the 
founding of other firms. This occurs because the expectation of likely outcomes is altered by the 
adopted beliefs that catalyzed the institutional change. For example, the changes are effective 
because they influence investment behavior. But that behavior is anchored in the beliefs 
associated with the technological investment context from which they were adopted. As a 
consequence, investors eschew Japan’s context dependent investment opportunities in 
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manufacturing and trade. In this way we add to the idea that entrepreneurial behavior and 
investment is socially constructed and can be constrained by beliefs to cause behaviors that can 
seem less optimal. 
Implications for Public Policy 
A principal policy implication of our findings is the need for caution concerning IPO 
market reform. Lowering IPO requirements is likely to create more IPOs and attract more capital, 
but this reform may not necessarily benefit all industry sectors and all entrepreneurs. Rather, the 
reform may over-allocate investment into “popular” industries, and fail to support worthy 
entrepreneurs.  
A key to effective deployment of IPO market reform is understanding where executives 
and investors believe that IPOs are relevant, and for which entrepreneurs they are most beneficial. 
Moreover, a central insight is that the primary influence of this reform from the public policy 
perspective is not the immediate effects of IPO. Rather, it is the more distant and subtle influence 
on attracting capital and affecting subsequent new firm performance. Lowering barriers to 
successful exit is thus a powerful - but unexpectedly complicated -institutional reform that can 
bring too much capital to the wrong entrepreneurs. 
Conclusion 
We began with observation that lowering IPO requirements for listing on public equity 
markets is a widespread institutional reform that is being adopted in many nations around the 
globe to promote entrepreneurial activity and economic prosperity. Using institutional theory, we 
find that IPO reform’s effects are complex and not anticipated by policy makers. It increases IPO 
activity and focuses increased investment. But we also find that this reform can have little effect 
outside of its focus, may waste capital, and may actually decrease new firm performance. Thus, 
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this reform yields unanticipated effects, and tends to harm the performance among new firms in 
the technical industries that it intended to help. 
Overall, we contribute an understanding of where institutional change will be effective 
and for whom. We contribute to the literature on institutional theory in two ways. First, we show 
that institutional change was brought about due to changes in beliefs. As Japanese government 
and business leaders began comparing their economic performance and formal institutions to the 
U.S. during the boom in the late 1990’s in the technology sector, they began to push for reform. 
Second, our findings suggest that institutions that are transferred directly to a different place are 
not likely to be equally effective in every country. Differing institutional environments more 
broadly in Japan as compared with the US result in differing levels of effectiveness. Therefore, 
we bring a more context-dependent view of institutional change to the literature on institutions 
and entrepreneurship. 
Broadly, we conclude that institutional theory is a powerful lens. It indicates both the 
general implications of lowered barriers to successful exit, and the particular nuances of how that 
institutional reform plays out in Japan. It also emphasizes that preparing the institutional 
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IPO  JPY 
 
Tokyo – 1st 
Section 
   20,000      800    1 billion 500 million       50 billion 
MOTHERS / 
HECULES 
1,000 / 500      300 
 
     none     none     500 million 
 
Table 2a – Summary Statistics 
Univariate Pre-Reform  Post-Reform 
Statistics Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
IPO  2.082%   14.277%     2.449%  15.455% 
Foreign Ownership  0.632%     7.928%     1.020%  10.049% 
Employees 97.464 202.008  128.229 725.916 
Founder Gender 93.411%   24.809%   93.107%  25.335% 
Over 40 Founder 60.891%   48.801%   71.874%  44.949% 
GDP Growth   1.067%     0.781%     0.924%    0.835% 
Firm Age 25.505 132.078     8.133    2.139 
Tokyo 20.006%   40.006%   28.257%  45.028% 
Osaka  8.222%  27.471%     8.248%  27.511% 
Primary  0.088%    2.858%     0.0437%    2.091% 
Manufacturing  8.614%  28.058%     6.251%  24.211% 
Whole/retail 17.124%  37.673%   15.316%  36.017% 
Service 70.811%  45.465%   76.115%  42.641% 
Finance  3.098%  17.327%     1.923%  13.736% 
Technology  9.197%  27.434%     9.210%  28.919% 
Growth  0.530%    0.169%  1.625%    1.640% 
Observations   12491       6862  
      
 
Table 2b – Summary Statistics IPO only firms 
Univariate Pre-Reform  Post-Reform 
Statistics Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Foreign Ownership  0.384%     6.201%     2.976%  17.043% 
Employees 314.062 927.318  236.464 592.230 
Founder Gender 98.076%   13.760%   98.214%  13.218% 
Over 40 Founder 29.615%   45.744%   58.928%  49.343% 
Firm Age 16.004     3.001     8.435    2.199 
Tokyo 66.153%   47.409%   74.405%  43.769% 
Osaka  8.076%  27.301%     3.571% 18.614% 
Primary  0.000%    0.000%     0.000%    0.000% 
Manufacturing  2.692%  16.217%     4.167%  20.042% 
Whole/retail 22.307%  41.711%   10.714%  31.022% 
Service 71.538%  45.211%   81.547%  38.907% 
Finance   2.308%  15.043%    1.786%  13.282% 
Technology  22.308%  27.434%   17.857%  28.919% 
Growth   0.707%    0.274%     2.359%    2.672% 
Observations   260       168  




Table 3  - Correlation Matrix 
                     |    (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8)      
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(1)  Foreign Owners  |   1.000 
(2)  Employees       |   0.020   1.000 
(3)  Founder Gender  |   0.006   0.038   1.000 
(4)  Over 40 Founder |   0.021   0.101  -0.057   1.000 
(5)  GDP Growth      |  -0.008  -0.030   0.001  -0.061   1.000 
(6)  Firm Age        |  -0.006   0.002  -0.005  -0.084   0.203   1.000 
(7)  Primary         |  -0.002  -0.012   0.007  -0.001   0.001  -0.001   1.000 
(8)  Manufacturing   |  -0.008  -0.073   0.021  -0.027  -0.009  -0.016  -0.008   1.000 
(9)  Wholesale/Retail|   0.066  -0.087   0.028  -0.076   0.039  -0.007  -0.012  -0.133    
(10) Service         |  -0.045   0.119  -0.032   0.094  -0.021   0.020  -0.042  -0.470   
(11) Finance         |  -0.009  -0.001  -0.010  -0.038  -0.017  -0.009  -0.005  -0.051   
(12) Technology      |   0.008  -0.037   0.049  -0.138   0.021  -0.020  -0.008  -0.090   
(13) Tokyo           |   0.089  -0.015   0.016  -0.117   0.016  -0.011  -0.008  -0.060   
(14) Osaka           |   0.000  -0.021  -0.011  -0.043  -0.003   0.010  -0.008  -0.001    
(15) Reform          |   0.021  -0.038  -0.015   0.084   0.188  -0.068  -0.005  -0.045   
 
      (9)    (10)    (11)    (12)     (13)    (14)    (15) 
        +-------------------------------------------------------- 
(9)  Wholesale/Retail|   1.000 
(10) Service         |  -0.719   1.000 
(11) Finance         |  -0.078  -0.277   1.000 
(12) Technology      |  -0.134   0.166  -0.053   1.000 
(13) Tokyo           |  -0.002   0.041  -0.012   0.241   1.000 
(14) Osaka           |   0.049  -0.033  -0.017  -0.014  -0.159   1.000 

































Table 4 IPO Likelihood  (Periods 1990-1999, 2000-2007) 
DV = IPO,   
Piecewise Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
   Controls                           1990 – 1999             2000-2008 t-statistic 
 
GDP Growth   0.000*** 
   (0.000) 
Employees   0.685*** 
   (0.0267) 
Initial Capital   1.983*** 
   (0.046) 
Reform       0.000***  0.000***  0.385   
      (0.000)  (0.000) 
Gender       3.464*   2.430*   0.173 
      (2.021)  (1.100) 
Over 40 Founder       0.446***  0.390***  0.015 
      (0.138)  (0.184) 
Manufacturing      0.233*   0.646   0.826 
      (0.170)  (0.459) 
Wholesale/Retail      0.382   1.618   3.134*** 
      (0.089)  (0.801) 
Service       0.217**    0.332*   0.503 
      (0.134)  (0.198) 
Finance (non-bank)     0.152**    1.054   1.164 
      (0.129)  (0.766) 
Technology      0.925   7.146***  1.883* 
      (0.204)  (1.193) 
Tokyo                  5.592***            10.265***              6.523***  
                 (1.272)                 (1.386) 
Osaka                  1.335                    4.156***              3.988***  
                 (0.715)                  (0.980) 
N                 31,509 
Number of Subjects                 19,133 
Number of failures (IPO’s)                      428  
                 15145.40***  





















Table 5 – Initial Capital Effects 
DV – Initial Capital (log) 
GLM Differences-in-
Differences  










      
Foreign Ownership       1.401***       1.366***      1.399***      1.365*** 
  (0.214)  (0.213) (0.214) (0.213) 
Founder Gender 
 




    0.347***  
(0.068) 
      0.814*** 
(0.032) 
     7.111*** 
       0.345*** 
(0.068) 
      0.814*** 
(0.031) 
       7.057*** 
       0.344*** 
(0.068) 
      0.816*** 
(0.031) 
      7.081*** 
       0.341*** 
      (0.068) 
       0.813*** 
(0.031) 
      7.032*** 
  (0.053)  (0.052)      (0.053)  (0.053) 
Tokyo        0.422***        0.424***           0.257***        0.266*** 
  (0.431) (0.043) (0.049)      (0.049) 
Osaka  0.014 0.012      -0.007      -0.002 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.062) (0.062) 
Reform        -0.065        0.394      -0.212**        0.427 
  (0.079)       (0.631) (0.084) (0.631) 
Primary Industry X Reform                      -1.160**      -0.598**  -1.223* 
    (0.675) (0.247) (0.671) 
Manufacturing X Reform           -0.262 
     (0.639) 
Wholesale/Retail X Reform     -0.381 
      (0.629) 
Services X Reform     -0.755 
      (0.624) 
Finance X Reform     -0.289 
      (0.656) 
Technology X Reform        0.398**      0.206** 
     (0.098)  (0.105) 
Tokyo X Reform         0.488***       0.474*** 
    (0.090) (0.094) 
Osaka X Reform    0.085 0.059 
    (0.125) (0.124) 
      
Constant  37,455*** 37.089*** 37.386***      36.989*** 
  (0.339) (0.377) (0.337) (0.375) 
N  18,839 18,839 18,839 18,839 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Annual Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      














Table 6 – Performance Effects 
DV – Growth  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GLM Differences-in-
Differences 








       
Foreign Ownership   0.174***  0.174***  0.171***  0.161**  0.167** 
  (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) 
Employees   0.236***  0.236***  0.237***  0.234***  0.238*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Founder Gender   0.075***  0.076***  0.074***  0.072***  0.075*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Over 40 Founder   0.027***  0.027***  0.027***  0.025***  0.029*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
GDP Growth   0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Firm Age  -2.222*** -2.222*** -2.217*** -2.216*** -2.211*** 
  (0.227) (0.227) (0.226) (0.224) (0.225) 
Firm Age2   0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tokyo   0.141***  0.142***  0.059***  0.146***  0.051*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.006) (0.023) (0.006) 
Osaka   0.047***  0.047***  0.040***  0.045***  0.046*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) 
Reform  -2.117*** -2.101*** -2.172*** -1.853*** -2.157*** 
  (0.225) (0.224) (0.231) (0.336) (0.230) 
Primary X Reform    0.030  0.084 -0.209  0.081 
   (0.238) (0.237) (0.344) (0.237) 
Manufacturing X Reform      0.003  
     (0.292)  
Whole/retail X Reform     -0.077  
     (0.248)  
Service X Reform     -0.317  
     (0.245)  
Finance X Reform      0.101  
     (0.278)  
Technology X Reform   -0.136***  -0.073***  
   (0.025)  (0.022)  
Tokyo X Reform     0.203***   0.263*** 
    (0.046)  (0.056) 
Osaka X Reform     0.023   
    (0.036)   
Tokyo X Technology      -0.012 
      (0.014) 
Tokyo X Technology X Reform       -0.296*** 
      (0.056) 
       
Constant  45.647*** 45.643*** 45.549*** 45.433*** 45.386*** 
  (4.683) (4.681) (4.663) (4.629) (4.642) 
Observations  19,168 19,168 19,168 19,168 19,168 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Annual Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 










Appendix 1 – Initial Capital Effects - Quantile Regressions      
  
GLM Regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV= Initial Capital (log) 10th Quantile 25th Quantile 75th Quantile 90th Quantile 
          
Foreign Ownership       0.957***      1.299***       1.550***      2.245*** 
 
(0.174) (0.238) (0.200) (0.557) 
Founder Gender 0.288*       0.223*** 0.192       0.265*** 
 (0.151) (0.043) (0.135) (0.094) Over 40 Founder 0.000       0.182***       0.859***       0.787*** 
 (0.000) (0.052) (0.042) (0.053) GDP Growth   8.802*   8.565*   5.162*   4.165* 
 (4.545) (4.461) (2.812) (2.223) Tokyo 0.000       0.213***       0.292***       0.630*** 
 (0.000) (0.061) (0.051) (0.161) 
Osaka 0.000     0.183** -0.112     0.239** 
 (0.000) (0.062) (0.143) (0.081) 
Reform 0.000 0.173 -0.573 1.545 
 (0.512) (0.733) (1.521) (1.227) 
Primary Industry X Reform 0.041 -0.337 -0.674   -3.377** 
 (0.703) (0.724) (1.724) (1.407) 
Manufacturing X Reform    -1.163** -0.173 0.573 -1.193 
 (0.591) (0.681) (1.561) (1.273) 
Wholesale/Retail X Reform -0.916 -0.068 0.674 -1.512 
 (0.593) (0.706) (1.503) (1.326) 
Services X Reform -0.916* -0.386 0.072 -1.893 
 (0.537) (0.690) (1.564) (1.269) 
Finance X Reform -0.288 -0.163 0.707 -1.199 
 (0.613) (0.710) (1.468) (1.412) 
Technology X Reform -0.000     0.202**       0.665***  0.201 
 (0.043) (0.084) (0.149) (0.245) 
Tokyo X Reform       0.916***     0.333** 0.137   0.398* 
 
(0.153) (0.124) (0.139) (0.232) 
Osaka X Reform       1.021*** -0.021 -0.042 -0.216 
 (0.191) (0.067) (0.223) (0.198) 
     
Constant 42.126** 41.316**     32.001***     29.518*** 
 
(17.144) (16.805) (10.614) (8.471) 
Observations 13,899 13,899 13,899 13,899 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 











Appendix 2 – Performance Quantile Effects 
     Quantile Regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV= Growth 10th Quantile 25th Quantile 75th Quantile 90th Quantile 
          
Foreign Ownership      0.059***      0.082***      0.145***      0.246*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.055) (0.087) Employees      0.083***      0.082***       0.083***      0.087*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Founder Gender      0.034***      0.023***      0.033***      0.041*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) Over 40 Founder -0.005*  -0.004* -0.005* -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
GDP Growth     -0.024***      -0.023***      -0.026***      -0.028*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) 
Firm Age     -0.000***      -0.000***      -0.000***      -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tokyo      0.018***      0.023***      0.044***      0.057*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) 
Osaka      0.020***      0.022***      0.033***      0.037*** 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) 
Reform     0.124**      0.161***     0.264**     0.208** 
 
(0.053) (0.050) (0.116) (0.104) 
Primary X Reform      0.523***      0.353*** 0.056    -0.248** 
 (0.077) (0.064) (0.156) (0.123) 
Manufacturing X Reform -0.058 -0.062 -0.101 0.021 
 (0.058) (0.053) (0.122) (0.123) 
Whole/retail X Reform -0.037 -0.048 -0.100 -0.056 
 (0.058) (0.048) (0.121) (0.109) 
Service X Reform   -0.100* -0.113** -0.204*    -0.198** 
 (0.051) (0.049) (0.113) (0.096) 
Finance X Reform -0.018 0.009 -0.038 -0.105 
 (0.051) (0.045) (0.113) (0.194) 
Technology X Reform 0.014 -0.010      -0.056***      -0.115*** 
 (0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) 
Tokyo X Reform       0.035***      0.036***      0.090***      0.161*** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.019) (0.040) 
Osaka X Reform 0.000 0.012 0.042**      0.094*** 
 
(0.032) (0.012) (0.020) (0.026) 
    
Constant      -0.129***      -0.070*** 0.022 0.057 
 
(0.033) (0.011) (0.037) (0.056) 
Observations 19,168 19,168 19,168 19,168 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Annual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Robust standard errors in Parentheses  * p < 0.10,  ** p < 0.05,  *** p < 0.01 
 
